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Book Review

Justifying Ethics:

Human Rights & Human Nature
REVIEWED BY CELIA R. TAYLOR*

JAN GORECKI, JUSTIFYING ETHICS: HUMAN RIGHTS & HUMAN
NATURE; Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, New Jersey (1996);
($32.00); ISBN 1-56000-236-0, 147 pp. (hardcover)
Justifying Ethics: Human Rights & Human Nature is a thoughtful, well written and ultimately frustrating attempt to rationalize some
of the struggles confronting those attempting to incorporate human
rights into domestic and international legal structures. In its strongest sections (and there are many of them) Gorecki directly addresses
such difficult issues as the search for objective justification of moral
utterances. If such justification could be found, incorporation of human rights would be far less problematic than it currently proves to
be. Unfortunately for both human rights proponents and readers of
this book, the solution is not that simple. Concluding that objective
justification is not possible and is indeed an impediment to the struggle for incorporation, Gorecki attempts to rationalize an approach for
incorporating some human rights in some situations. His suggested
approach begs fundamental questions and is far less successful than
his earlier insightful analysis and articulation of how to think about
human rights generally.
Any author attempting to address the idea of human rights must
define the term. For Gorecki, "human rights" are at heart, moral
rights, but only in a limited sense of morality as a system of rights and
duties. These moral rights may become legal rights, but only when
some positive law implements them.

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; LL.M. Columbia University; J.D. New York University School of Law; B.A. George Washington University.
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As moral rights, human rights are acquired through a process of
contagious social learning and are therefore dependant on the society
in which they are generated. Every society is a large, ongoing referendum of evaluations of moral rights; any particular rights acceptance
depends on a complex set of social and ecological concerns; concerns
which will differ both from place to place and from time to time. By
adopting this definition of human rights, Gorecki takes the position
that all human rights are neither universal nor constant, but are subject to important and "dangerous" historical limitations. In addition,
he acknowledges that human rights under this approach are subjective, based on personal pronouncements of right and wrong.
Gorecki is clearly not happy with this result. If any human rights
are to gain acceptance as universal, they cannot be perceived as
changeable. Instead, some external, objective source of justification is
necessary to validate them. Does any source of objective justification
of human rights (morality) exist? To test this, Gorecki identifies potential sources of justification, including human nature, divine will,
reason and cognitivism. For each of these sources, he considers
whether its claim to justify human rights can be rebutted by defect of
logic, lack of persuasive force, or evidence that the event claimed to
create the norm has not occurred.
It should come as no surprise that Gorecki concludes that none of
the suggested sources objectively justify human rights, but his analysis
of the issue is the heart of the book and a valuable contribution to the
dialogue. For example, in his analysis of human nature as a potential
source, Gorecki identifies two possible elements that could provide
objective justification. First, there exists an identifiable category of
universal human needs and wants, constituted of the biological basics
of existence; food, water, air, etc. If the recognition of this category as
universal leads to a universal "rule of recognition" i.e., because these
needs are universal we should give them to everyone (or at least not
deprive anyone of them) the human right to these basics would be
objectively justified. However, for Gorecki, such recognition does not
occur and the minor premise of everyone having universal biological
needs does not carry the persuasive force necessary to become a universal human right. Societies can and do deprive individuals of even
these basic needs. Thus, human nature will permit actions even in
contradiction to a universal human need and therefore cannot serve as
an objective verification of human rights.
In a similar fashion, Gorecki discounts the existence of any universally accepted moral norms which could serve as justification. For
example, although most would concur that "no killing" is a "widely
accepted norm, society sanctions killing in many contexts. Thus, the
norm itself cannot be deemed universal and human nature cannot
provide a source of universal ethical inclinations.
These examples grossly oversimplify the author's careful consider-
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ation of each potential source of objective justification. His analysis is
cogent and exhaustive; drawing heavily on philosophy, religion and
history, Gorecki presents a convincing argument that objective justification of human rights is not possible.
This poses a serious problem for human rights proponents. Justification aids recognition and implementation of rights. Human rights
face particular problems in these areas given that conflicting ethnic,
economic and political interests lead to dramatically different articulations of rights, and a general vagueness of sources and weakness in
the enforcement of rights prevents even broadly acknowledged rights
from having much force. Therefore, the need for justification of rights
is great, and yet, we have now been told, impossible. This then is the
core of the problem; rights which the author would like to see recognized and implemented cannot be justified and will depend on the level
of development in any society. How then can broader recognition of
all rights be encouraged? Unfortunately, in his attempt to address this
problem, Gorecki's rigorous analysis fails. The remainder of his argument posits facile solutions to intractable problems.
Essentially, Gorecki falls back on the inherent goodness of humans. Humans are polymorphic. Certain individuals who are exceptional will always exist in every society. Quoting Stanislaw Ossowski,
Gorecki states that if these individuals push a human rights agenda
"we may expect that the attitudes, today somewhat exceptional, could,
in different circumstances, spread to a degree determining the new
shape of the whole of social life." Humans are capable of holding conflicting views and are capable of changing their positions on ethical
issues. This plasticity provides hope. "[Olne should fight for what
ought to be done without speculating" about nature, reason, divine
orders, etc.
In the face of a potentially insurmountable obstacle to the implementation of human rights, Gorecki now has a way forward. It is possible to acknowledge the impossibility of locating an objective source of
justification of ethics or rights while still arguing that efforts towards
recognition and implementation should continue.
The issue then arises of what rights should be fought for? If no
rights are objectively justified, how do we select among the many put
forward for recognition? Are any more "worthy" than others? What
rights should be the focus of a struggle to turn the moral idea of some
to the moral idea of many, and thus, eventually (in theory) into the
moral idea of the entire species? This struggle must include two components; that of spreading the norm itself through "moral contagion"
and fighting for the implementation of the norm by states. Clearly,
these efforts will require tremendous energy and dedication from activists and others interested in enhancing human rights protections. If
success is to be had for any rights, the field of potentially enforceable
rights needs to be narrowed from the entire spectrum currently avail-
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able to a more workable field.
In order to restrict the field, Gorecki immediately dismisses third
generation rights, which include such things as the right to development. In a somewhat disingenuous argument, he states that while
such claims may "constitute a well-founded moral right" they are, as
human rights, "such an ambiguous, self-contradictory dangerous and
unhelpful novelty, that it would be difficult to opt for their inclusion
into the human rights catalog." The problem of course lies in that
Gorecki himself has defined human rights as moral rights; once recognizing the inherent morality of third generation rights, they are every
bit as eligible for inclusion as any others.
However, limiting human rights to first generation political rights
and second generation social and economic rights, Gorecki then attempts to limit the field further. Recognizing that societies prioritize
rights differently depending on their level of development, he separates
human rights into two categories. The first category includes those
rights that are universally feasible for all societies, regardless of their
level of development. In this grouping he includes the universal prohibitions on genocide, torture, racial discrimination and slave trade. For
Gorecki, these rights, and only these rights, are "actually" universally
human.
The second category includes rights that are only potentially universally human. These are rights which depend on the level of development of the implementing society. Included in this category as such
rights as the right to democracy, unemployment protections, rest and
leisure etc. This admission puts Gorecki clearly back in the camp of
those who deny the universality of rights; if a society has the ability to
claim that its level of development prohibits it from recognizing those
rights which are only potentially universally human, those rights are
not universally human.

.

.

yet.

For Gorecki, this is not an untenable position. Potentially universal human rights will become actual universal human rights through
the same process of contagion that raises the norm to the realm of a
right in the first instance. When enough societies reach a sufficient
level of development and enough states incorporate recognition of human rights into their legal regimes, all those rights which are now
only potentialities will be realities.
Gorecki's ultimate conclusion then seems to be that rights will be
recognized and implemented because it is the right thing to do. We
will have to be ever vigilant to ensure that the contagion process produces acceptable results, but the framework for widespread acceptance
of human rights exists even if there is no readily identifiable external
justification of our ethical positions.
This optimistic view is sure to please many human rights proponents. However, it begs several important questions. By recognizing
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that the implementation of rights will depend on the level of development in the society, a system is created which says some humans have
right A while others do not. Are those who live in less developed countries thereby less human than others because they are not permitted to
assert the same "human" rights? Gorecki recognizes this dilemma, but
attempts to resolve it by separating rights into actual and potential
rights is not satisfying. Either the right exists or it does not. Perhaps
the "actual" human rights defined by Gorecki are more properly understood to be duties of the State. Taking them out of the rights definition clarifies that human rights must exist in all humans no matter
their situation on the planet. Perhaps all rights are only potentially
realizable. This would not preclude societies from recognizing them
but it would eliminate the need to argue that some have rights while
others not based on no more cogent distinction than geography.
Another significant problem lies in Gorecki's reliance on contagion. He assumes that as proponents fight for broader acceptance of
rights considered potentially human, these ideas will spread worldwide. However, he also acknowledges that many societies do not have
the necessary preconditions to incorporate these rights. How then will
contagion occur when the society by his argument cannot accept such
ideas. Further, his agenda for the implementation of human rights is
premised on the belief that "exceptional" individuals will exist in each
society, and further, that their views will be toward the advancement
of human rights. It is just as easy to conceive of such individuals who
would seriously impede the progress of rights. The "plasticity" of humans, the ability to accept and adopt new moral norms, could be
turned against a human rights agenda just as it could be put to work
in its favor.
Gorecki recognizes his fundamental problem. His conclusion that
no objective justification of human rights is possible removes any secure position from which to argue that rights must be recognized and
incorporated into the international legal structure. Unwilling to abandon the struggle, he is left to argue that the search for justification is
in itself useful. The means justifies the means, as the struggle for
widespread recognition of rights will increase contagion of societies
with the norms thus enhancing their persuasiveness. The sentiment
underlying his argument is understandable. The inherent difficulty of
advancing human rights can seem insurmountable. His proposal at
least offers hope for those who advocate broader acceptance of human
rights, while placating those who argue that rights are situation specific. However, this compromise solution ultimately undermines the
work. After setting up the problem clearly and intelligently, the book
adds little by way of practical suggestions to overcome it. The book
leaves the reader hoping for a sequel to remedy that situation.

